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NATO 3.0

Ready for a New World

Under the direction of:
Rafael L. Bardají and Manuel Coma



Strategic Studies Group /
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The Strategic Studies Group is the oldest foreign affairs think tank in Spain. The Group produces cutting-edge strategic forecasting as well as defense- and security-related research and analysis for governments, international organizations and corporations in Europe, the United States and around the world.

Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos (GEES)
Diego de León, 47
28006 Madrid, Spain

<http://www.gees.org>
info@gees.org

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


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INTRODUCTION

April 2009 marks the 60th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. When the representatives of NATO's twenty-six member states gather in Strasbourg-Kehl on April 4, not only can they feel pleased with the longevity of their organization but also with its historical achievements: Created to confront the Soviet threat, NATO has become a force of stability and peace in the Balkans; it has gone from twelve original members to twenty-six and it has even ventured into faraway regions that are quite distant from Europe, such as Afghanistan, where allied forces fight the Taliban and try to guarantee the security and reconstruction of that country.

Nonetheless, this is not the most important issue. The real relevant factor here is that, sixty years after the signing of the Washington Treaty to build NATO's collective defense, the members of the Alliance are facing a situation very similar in strategic terms to the one they had to face at the end of the 1940s.

Indeed, today just as before, the powers comprising this part of the world known as the West must be up to the challenge of not only a new and increasingly complex environment, but, in essence, also a more dangerous world for its citizens, interests, security and survival.

1949	 United States,  Canada,  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Iceland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Norway,  United Kingdom,  The Netherlands, and  Portugal.
1951	 Greece and  Turkey
1954	 Germany
1982	 Spain
1999	 Hungary,  Poland, and  The Czech Republic
2004	 Bulgaria,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania, and  Romania

Today just as before, there are forces challenging our peaceful existence and some of them aspire to do away with our way of life. Today, just as before, no nation alone can confront adversaries and enemies; in order to prevail against enemies, nations need the help and solidarity of partners and allies. Today just as before, inaction is not a reasonable and sensible choice. If, unlike 1949, the 2009 allies were not able to agree on the course of action to follow in

order to guarantee their own security and to project stability towards other areas of the world; if they were not able to forge a common vision, to fully identify with a feeling of collective purpose, NATO as an institution and its members, as well as the Western realm will be doomed to fail.

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty

That failure would be all the more resounding now since the members of the Atlantic Alliance objectively have all the resources and instruments necessary to defend themselves as well as to contain or eliminate the threats looming over them today. Worse yet, if NATO members are not able to revitalize the ties that bind them together and agree on necessary common strategic operations, they and their institutions will be missing the historical opportunity to shape the emerging new international order –

and NATO has an important role to play in that challenge.

During four decades, NATO mainly served the purpose to contain and deter a threatening Soviet Union. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO not only completed its historical task to overcome the division of the European continent, imposed by the Red Army's tanks after World War II, but the Alliance also knew how to transform itself into an exporting agent of stability beyond its own borders – first on Europe's periphery and later in other continents. From 2001, due to the dramatic events of September 11, perpetrated by jihadist terrorists, the Alliance had to take into consideration the rise of a new enemy whose nature was radically different from the one to which its members were used. Adapting to the environment generated by al-Qaeda and jihadism has been neither easy nor thorough. Differences of opinion about the scope of the new threat and the most effective measures to eliminate it have hindered the necessary adjustment during these years.

In 2005, we, at the Strategic Studies Group, published our first report about how NATO should transform in order to be relevant in our new, post-September 11 strategic environment. Our motivation was, in the first place, due to the fear that NATO would become prisoner of its recent experience as an organization supplying stability and security to third parties. In the second place, we considered that it was of the utmost urgency for NATO to present a collective response to the main threat of this moment, namely, Islamist terrorism.

In that report titled *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom*, we advocated the need of the Alliance's strategic reorientation – from its peace missions to the fight against terrorism. An expansion that was not limited to the principle of a

“united and free Europe,” but that would strive for a “united and free Western world.” In pursuit of that goal, we proposed that NATO should be open to democratic countries willing and able to contribute to the West’s defense against terrorism, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and Israel; we also advanced some practical measures that could launch the Alliance on that specific course. Examples of those measures were: To approve a new strategic concept, the development of a Homeland Defense component or the institutional dialogue with the leaders in charge of Interior.

For us, after the chain of attacks on European soil in the aftermath of September 11 attacks, also known as 9/11, the Western world had become a clear target of radical fundamentalism’s malevolent goals – an ideology that has its most threatening expression in jihadism. Islamist terrorism had declared war, not only against the United States, but also against the Western world in general – in other words, against open and liberal democracies, most of them belonging to NATO.

For that reason, the philosophy that inspired our 2005 report clearly expressed the need to strengthen the Western world – with NATO as its best institutional expression up to that moment – in the understanding that the West was not just a geographic demarcation; it is a community sharing values, political culture, market economics and the same interests.

Four years later, NATO has evolved in the appropriate direction, as demonstrated by, for example, the operations in Afghanistan, the debate about global partners, technical cooperation with Israel, paying attention to terrorism or the debate about the development of a new strategic concept for next year. All of them are measures and ideas that we advocated in 2005 and with which we are in complete agreement.

Nevertheless, the evolution is incomplete; it progresses very unevenly and often overwhelmed by problems on the ground, particularly the issue of operations. In spite of its feverish activity during these years (aid to Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake; support to the African Union in the Darfur case; Afghanistan...), reality is that NATO has moved forward, but it has done it at a glacial pace in regards to its purpose and strategic target.

Even worse, NATO’s adjustment in recent years has always been much slower than the positive or negative changes emerging in its strategic environment and that affect the organization and its members. Perhaps this is the main problem afflicting the Alliance today. Globalization has brought more simultaneous changes than ever, but they come at an increasingly faster pace.

We think that NATO has the means to confront satisfactorily the new threats and challenges as long as its members are able to develop a strategic vision about the future of the Alliance; not just a vision scribbled on a piece of paper, but one that reflects the values in which the members truly believe.

This is not a matter of intellectual fancy. As we will see further on, we are entering a new era that already has little or nothing to do with the post-Cold War period. It is neither a universe in which our enemies have vanished, nor a system with which Europe and North America can feel contented enjoying a security bubble. On the contrary, our countries have gone from being nation-states to becoming target-states. In the eyes of our enemies, we are all strategic targets – and the enemies are plentiful.

In reality, several factors of insecurity are converging at this moment, casting Western liberal democracies in a crucible that goes beyond global jihadism. From a resurgent Russia to an emergent China, in addition to a threatening Iran and a whole constellation of small dictators and autocrats who, in sum, represent an important counterbalance for the international order. For that reason, standing up for our way of life, our societies and democracies, continues to be a vital necessity. Thus, an organization of collective defense, such as NATO, should also be considered under the same light.

Unlike those who do not perceive the threat to our societies or think that the West is doomed to decline, the Strategic Studies Group postulates a different thesis: Our security will diminish if we do not do anything to defend ourselves collectively from our enemies; yet this fate can be avoided. It requires having moral and strategic clarity in regards to our objectives. It also requires having the right political leadership that raises awareness and motivates the will of governments and public opinion in the Western world and in NATO.

The Strategic Studies Group strives to offer a path towards achieving this goal by publishing this study. The future of the West is at stake – nothing more, nothing less.

PAST IS PROLOGUE

During the first four decades after its creation in 1949, NATO's fundamental purpose was to deter the Soviet Union from mounting an attack against the Western world. In order to give credibility to its policies, NATO chose suitable strategies according to the occasion, encouraged one type of armed forces for its members and deployed its structures in a manner that would satisfy military operational needs and the essential political solidarity of every military alliance. However, it is convenient to remember that, from 1949 to 1989, NATO was a deterrent – in character and purpose.

In that first, though long, phase of its existence, that we will henceforth call NATO 1.0; the allies had to face an existential enemy who possessed the capability to end the world as we then knew it. Yet, our sworn enemy was rational and, at the same time, shared with the West an interest to avoid the use of its nuclear arsenals – since using these weapons guaranteed mutual assured destruction.

The military organizations of each side, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, became the most evident expression of the bipolar order reigning at the time. It was an extremely rigid order; every move was carefully planned to avoid putting in danger the delicate balance that sustained that order. Even internal dissent among allies always hit a clear limit: not to damage the deterring-defensive system against a credible threat that affected them all. Since its inception, the Atlantic Alliance was a strategic imperative for the Americans, but especially for the Europeans. While the Soviet Union was alive, nobody called into question the need to preserve NATO.

The world in 1949 and 2009

In the 1950s, just months after the creation of NATO, the world was enduring thirty-six wars and conflicts with various degrees of intensity – many related to decolonization. In the 1990s, in the midst of the post-Cold War period, that number rose to sixty. Today there are forty-two active conflicts generating violence and instability throughout the world – a higher number than back in 1949.

Source: Global Security 2009

Once the Warsaw Pact dissolved, Germany went into the reunification process and the Soviet Union disintegrated, the members of the Alliance fondly welcomed a new phase, which, for lack of a better term, they came to call “the post-Cold War era.” It is interesting to reflect, though briefly, about this particular characterization, since it faithfully portrays NATO's psychological state of mind during those first years of the 1990s: After the war, no matter how *cold* it had been, the euphoria of peace came along – which is what every post-war brings along.

Thinking of those months with the benefit of hindsight, we know now that the ideas that inspired, from “the End of History” to the “American unipolar moment,” were just the expressions of their authors' desires more than they were cold facts. Certainly, Europe was advancing towards reunification, with freedom and security expanding on its soil, and the specter of a nuclear war between East

and West had vanished. Yet, violence around the world, far from decreasing, burst with greater virulence instead. First, we witnessed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, soon after the civil wars in Yugoslavia and Algeria, followed by the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, East Timor, Chechnya and Afghanistan –to mention just the most well-known cases.

Nonetheless, NATO’s Eurocentrism made these conflicts seem like a remote occurrence, with indirect repercussions at the most, which, in any case, were not a threat to world stability – something that was largely accurate, at least in terms of power balance, but not so much in terms of social and moral responsibility. Neither Europe nor America could continue living in a bubble of apparent security while the rest of the world was plunging deeper into chaos.

Table I: NATO Missions in the 1990s

1992-1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Arms embargo against the whole of the former Yugoslavia and economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. ▪ Air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Operation Deliberate Force, ▪ IFOR comprised 60,000 troops from NATO and non-NATO countries. It was the Alliance’s first peacekeeping mission.
1996	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ IFOR was succeeded by a smaller NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR).
1999	Kosovo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Operation Allied Force (Mar-Jun) launched to halt violence directed by the Serbian police and military forces against Kosovar Albanians. ▪ A NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR) deployed into Kosovo on 12 June after a 78-day NATO air campaign.
1999	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NATO continues to lead SFOR, the international peacekeeping force in the country.

Source: NATO

NATO’s great paradox in these years was in being, theoretically, the world’s greatest military machine, but simultaneously unable to avoid or to stop the conflicts bursting around. To be fair, one must remember that, as mentioned above, during forty years, the allies were equipped with means necessary to deter the Soviet Union and NATO’s armed forces were essentially static and oriented towards the defense of allied territory. In the same fashion and, since it was based on the Soviet threat, the defense pact between the allies had very clearly and strictly defined geographic limits, as indicated in Article 6 of the foundational Washington Treaty.

Be that as it may, the increase of violence in the Balkans and the inability that the United Nations and an incipient European Union demonstrated by failing to put an end to the horror unleashed in that region, would result in NATO’s strategic reorientation that, for the first time in its history, turned to the use of force. This event happened in spite that none of its members had been attacked in the first place. Neither was this an action taken in order to repeal an enemy country, but to try to impose the necessary conditions to achieve peace between opponents.

First were the bombings against Serbian positions, then the beginning of peacekeeping operations by IFOR and SFOR. Finally, Operation Allied Force, against the Serb military forces in Kosovo, would become the undeniable expression of the new direction taken by the Atlantic Alliance in the decade of the 1990s.

Deterrence would give way to operations; its static forces would adapt to be deployed and kept in areas far from their bases; defense would become marginal for the sake of intervention; and victory would be exchanged for what goes by the name of “peace support operations.” Unlike the United Nations, NATO is indeed able to impose peace on third parties – on its own terms and when the Alliance is determined to prevail.

NATO’s transition from 1.0, deterring and defensive, to NATO 2.0, ready for intervention beyond its borders – though the Balkans actually belongs to the Alliance’s periphery – was not going to be smooth and problem-free. It required modifying the organization’s structures and procedures, to redirect its forces, to ask its members to engage in an extraordinary effort, to close known organizational gaps, and to improve deficiencies in its capabilities. The 50th anniversary NATO Summit, celebrated precisely when the Alliance was fighting its first war, served to make the new NATO thoroughly accepted. A new Strategic Concept was approved, which codified to perfection the practice developed by the allies in the immediately preceding years – particularly all the details regarding the issue of peace support operations.

However, the most important factor during this stage was that NATO was about to experience, against all odds, a more benign environment in comparison to its previous stage: Nobody would put in danger the existence of its members and it seemed as if nothing could breach their security. NATO was able to act and, when it did, it was not for an existential need, but by choice. There were neither tanks invading its soil, nor bomber planes invading its airspace.

NATO 2.0, unlike NATO 1.0 that provided security exclusively for its members, will appear before the world as a force that could export stability and peace. This image would be the one that the Alliance conveyed to all those that were not its members, since the nations belonging to the organization – including the new members – enjoyed an existence free from any kind of threat. At least, that was the common belief of the times.

The attacks perpetrated by Islamic terrorism on September 11, 2001 would shake the foundations on which NATO had firmly rested during the decade of the 1990s. The world was not the purported peaceful millpond and the enemies of the West turned out to be much more dangerous than what we had wrongly estimated. It did not matter that we were not dealing with regular armies belonging to a state; bin Laden and al-Qaeda inaugurated an era in which democratic societies could become threatened by small groups with limited resources, but with limitless ambitions.

Terrorism, which we categorically reject and condemn in all its forms and manifestations, poses a grave and growing threat to Alliance populations, forces and territory, as well as to international security. We are determined to combat this scourge for as long as necessary. To combat terrorism effectively, our response must be multi-faceted and comprehensive.

We are committed, in cooperation with our partners, to fully implement the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan for the improvement of civil preparedness against possible attacks against the civilian population with chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents. We will enhance our ability to provide support, when requested, to help national authorities to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks, including attacks with CBRN against critical infrastructure, as foreseen in the CEP Action Plan.

Prague Summit Declaration
November 21, 2002

In theory, the members of the Atlantic Alliance do recognize the danger that terrorism entails for all of them, as it can be read in their 2002 Prague Summit declaration; however, not all of them share one single vision about how to confront this menace. This rift would become obvious when the deliberations on what to do with Saddam Hussein's Iraq started – a problem that generated an intense debate among the allies, which ultimately ended up dissolving the traditional solidarity of the allies. As we all know today, it fractured NATO, provoking the marginalization of the Alliance in an issue so central for the security of the world.

The debate regarding Iraq actually eclipsed all attempts to analyze the strategic context that emerged with the September 11 attacks. In addition, the fact

“NATO Allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UNSCR 1441. We recall that the Security Council in this resolution has warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violation of its obligations.”

Prague Summit Declaration on Iraq
21 November 2002

that the main threat of radical Islamism on European soil would come from the so-called “home grown terrorism,” placed the Alliance in a relatively imprecise position: In spite of the fact that terrorism was considered a threat, the fight against the scourge basically depended on the ministries of Interior, the Police and intelligence services – agencies that were out of NATO's ambit, but completely within the authority of the European Union. Yet, NATO was contented with its subsidiary and instrumental role.

On the other hand, the allies were mostly focused on Afghanistan during these years. In the first place, because, in contrast to Iraq, they could say that they counted with a United Nations mandate. In the second place, because they could argue that they were not in favor of allied paralysis, but against the American policy in Iraq. And in the third place, because NATO landed in Afghanistan in a moment when the organization could justify its presence as one more peace support operation – to which public opinion was already so used. For many, Afghanistan was the good war and it had an easy solution.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan will end up being a serious problem for the Alliance, due to several reasons. For starters, the belief that the situation was of relative calm on the ground began to take a bad turn a little after NATO took over ISAF's responsibilities. The resurgence of a militant Taliban force in several provinces generated an alarming inequality of responsibilities among the allies. Some of them had to engage in combat to ensure their own security and to be able to carry out the assigned mission, while at the same time there were other allies who could remain combat-free on the sidelines since they just had to patrol less problematic areas. In fact, this kind of friction among the allies has not stopped, and has reached the point in which it is putting in danger the viability and success of the mission.

The NATO of the twenty-first century's first years will undoubtedly experience growing confusion, in spite of the parallel increase in its activity. On the one hand, some of its members will suffer terrorist attacks – and the Alliance's reaction to these events will be more a matter of rhetoric than one of practical solidarity. As populations increasingly see themselves as the target of Islamist threats, the question arising in everyone's mind is evident: Why can NATO guarantee the security of, for example, Kosovars, but not the security of member states' citizens? On the other hand, if the presence of allied troops in Afghanistan is vital for allied security, why is there such disparity when it comes to the contribution of the allies?

Table II: NATO Missions 2000

2001-present	Afghanistan	International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)	55,100 troops from 41 countries and 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
1999-present	Kosovo	Kosovo Force (KFOR)	16,000 military personnel from over 30 countries.
1996-2005	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Stabilization Force (SFOR)	36 Allied and Partner countries contributed troops. Soldiers from five countries that were neither NATO members nor Partner countries participated.
2004-present	Iraq	NATO Training Assistance Implementation Mission (NTM-I)	151,000 troops approx. total deployment as of 8/08. 14 nations have staff as of January 2009.
2003-present	Eastern Mediterranean	Operation Active Endeavor (OAE)	NATO member countries and partner countries: Russia and Ukraine.
2005-present	Sudan	Supporting African Union's peacekeeping mission in Darfur	
2005	Pakistan	Pakistan relief operation	NATO's responses to the South Asian earthquake in Pakistan propelled the Alliance into the disaster-relief spotlight.

Source: NATO

Finally, Russia's invasion of neighboring Georgia during the summer of 2008 would highlight even more patently the absence of common purpose about what NATO should be and do. After almost twenty years without having to worry about the collective defense of European soil and dedicating instead the organization's

potential to expeditionary missions of diverse nature and scope, a significant part of NATO's members, particularly the newly admitted countries from East and Central Europe, feel directly threatened once more by a neighboring state – Russia.

The current paradox is that NATO has chosen to become marginal in the issues pertaining homeland security and has abandoned what used to be its greatest strength for years: the planning and preparation for the collective defense of its members. In the end, the Alliance proves to be badly prepared for conducting peace support operations when, as it is the case of Afghanistan, the missions cannot be carry out in friendly theaters.

In Afghanistan, NATO is fighting against its own past. Yet in order to find its path to the future, the Alliance must not only come out a winner but it must face the harsh reality of the new emerging strategic order by undertaking the necessary measures and by acquiring the necessary means to guarantee the security of its members and the stability of the global milieu. The Atlantic Alliance must take the leap from NATO 2.0 to NATO 3.0. Today the organization is in a position that, in the long run, is untenable.

Table III: Main contributions of NATO summit meetings

April 2008 Bucharest	The invitation of Albania and Croatia to start the accession process; NATO welcomes the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia for membership in NATO; ISAF mission recognized as the Alliance's top priority; NATO reaffirms its commitment with Kosovo; Russia's ratification of the Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement; Allies reaffirm their support for existing non-proliferation agreements and express their concern about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
Nov 2006 Riga	The members of the Alliance agree to improve military and civilian aspects of the mission in Afghanistan; NATO Response Force (NRF) declared operational. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia invited to join Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
June 2004 Istanbul	Participation of seven new members to the event (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia); Expansion of NATO's operation in Afghanistan; Assistance to Iraq Government; Strengthening contributions to the fight against terrorism, danger of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation; Launch of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with countries from the broader Middle East region..
Nov 2002 Prague	Adoption of a series of measures to improve military capabilities; the NATO Response Force (NRF); Adoption of a Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism. Decision to support NATO member countries in Afghanistan.
May 2002 Rome	NATO Allies and the Russian Federation create the NATO-Russia Council , where they meet as equal partners.
April 1999 Washington	Commemoration of NATO's 50th Anniversary. Launch of the Defense Capabilities Initiative ; Strengthening of Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue; Launch of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative.; South East Europe Initiative.
July 1997 Madrid	Signature of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine; Updating of the 1991 Strategic Concept; Reform of the NATO military command structure.
May 1997	Signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and

Paris	Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.
Jan 1994 Brussels	Launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. All European countries are invited to participate; Publication of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.
Nov 1991 Rome	Publication of the Alliance's new Strategic Concept , of the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation and of statements on developments in the Soviet Union and the situation in Yugoslavia.
Dec 1989 Brussels	Summit against the background of fundamental changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the prospect of the end of the division of Europe. Warsaw Pact leaders denounce the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and repudiate the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.
Nov 1985 Brussels	Special meeting of the North Atlantic Council for consultations with President Reagan on the outcome of the US-USSR Geneva Summit on arms control and other areas of cooperation.
May 1975 Brussels	Support for successful conclusion of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act (August 1975).
Dec 1957 Paris	Reaffirmation of the principle purposes and unity of the Atlantic Alliance. Improvements in the coordination and organization of NATO forces and in political consultation arrangements; Recognition of the need for closer economic ties and for cooperation among the allies.

NATO AND ITS ENEMIES

If the Alliance has been able to keep its role as provider of collective security, it is largely due to the strategic situation during these years, which was relatively benign for its members. And, in addition, because out of all of them, it is possible that only the United States interpreted the 9/11 attacks as a substantial alteration of the world's security conditions and was able to act accordingly.

The Administration of George W. Bush considered 9/11 as a point of inflection, opening a new strategic era in which the Western world was threatened one more time by an irregular and non-conventional enemy, but powerful, committed to the cause, patient and with great ambition. In our previous 2005 report, we had already considered that Islamist terrorism represented an existential threat to Western democracies. Therefore, NATO should be able to go through a transformation in order to confront this new, misunderstood, and lethal enemy. We thought that the Alliance should and could answer the threat in an efficient way, requiring just a few, though deep, changes to enable the proper response.

Four years later, we can state that the threat of jihadism has been relatively contained thanks to numerous factors: Military pressure in zones like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, permanent vigilance and successful prevention by intelligence services and law enforcement agencies. Fortunately, there have been no more attacks on the territory of any allied country. Nevertheless, the increasing number of detainees in relationship with Islamist terrorist activities in Europe and America, as well as the important number of frustrated and disrupted attempts, demonstrate that the Islamist threat has mutated, but it is far from fading. Even the issue of how much this threat has diminished is a matter of open debate among the experts.

The important thing for us is that, along with the endurance of jihadism, new risk factors have arisen in recent months. In spite of being a very disparate phenomenon, jihadism's cumulative effect increases the threat to our security in a way that we had not experienced in many years. Among the new risks factors, one can point out, for example, the return of a demanding Russia, that seeks superpower status and consequently clashes with the prevailing order, as well as with the Western idea on how to behave on the world stage; the increase in nuclear proliferation in countries such as North Korea and, mainly, Iran – a factor that hints the birth of a new atomic age; the riddle called China that, regardless of whether it becomes the rival of the United States, is able to destabilize the world due to its own leverage; and the rise of populism and anti-Westernism in vast zones of the world – with Ibero-America as a prime example. All these elements clearly form an increasingly complicated panorama not only for the members of NATO, but also for the interests of these nations and for their own existence. Particularly if one were to add into the mix the important vulnerabilities afflicting NATO as an institution as well as its members in their roles as national actors.

Furthermore, although these facts respond to their own particular dynamics, their strategic relevance as a whole intensifies when one observes how they are interconnecting, creating ties no one expected to see and heightening by a large margin the level of threat that each of them would represent for our security if confronted as isolated events. In regards to Western security issues, 2008 has not been just another year.

There is a new axis of convenience combining and amplifying the efforts of those who want to change the present distribution of power in their favor and question the liberal order; in plain words, they aspire to replace this order with their own. It might be considered as a bad joke that Evo Morales's Bolivia breaks off diplomatic relations with Israel in protest over the issue of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza; or that Hugo Chávez visits Ahmadinejad in Tehran – with the latter paying back the visit; or to have Beijing investing in strategic infrastructures in Ibero-America and Africa; or that, for the first time since the Cold War, the Russian Navy comes to visit Cuba and the Russian Air Force does the same in Venezuela. Yet, analyzed as a whole, these relationships are no joke.

This part of our Report will review what we consider the main threats to the present order and to NATO, since the Alliance is the defense organization of the countries that have created and sustained this order. In the next pages, we will address the main vulnerabilities that reduce the effectiveness of the collective answer.

Russia: The Threat to the Post-Cold War Order

The year 1989 marked the end of an era: The fall of the infamous Berlin Wall, the dismemberment of the Warsaw Pact and the ultimate disappearance of the Soviet Union left behind an era of confrontation that, at the same time, opened the door to a promising new era of understanding and cooperation with Russia. Freedom extended throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Once communism faded away, the ideological rivalry was overcome and it seemed as if a new Russia, more debilitated, cooperative and integrated than the USSR, would finally mean the end of the geostrategic dilemmas that had plagued the Old Continent.

Twenty years later, we know that idyllic vision has not completely materialized. Even worse, it may be an absolutely unfeasible enterprise. With the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Russia not only takes center stage once more in Europe's strategic arena, but also brings to an end our rosy picture of history and shows the dangerous comeback of hardball power politics.

Table IV: Recent Acts of Intimidation by Russia

January 2009	Threats to cut the logistics route into Afghanistan
January 2009	Gas embargo on Ukraine
December 2008	Russia delivers latest generation of anti-air defense systems to Iran.
November 2008	Russian strategic bombers land in Venezuela
November 2008	Russian naval maneuvers with nuclear ships in the Caribbean
November 2008	Threats to deploy missiles in Kaliningrad
February 2008	Threats to point nuclear missiles at Ukraine
August 2008	The invasion of Georgia
February 2007	Threats to point nuclear missiles at Poland and the Czech Republic
February 2007	Threats to withdraw from the INF Treaty
April 2007	Cyberattack on Estonia
January 2007	Energy embargo against Belarus
June 2007	Threats to point nuclear missiles at Europe
January 2005	Russia cuts Ukraine gas supply

Westerners never sought to humiliate Russia for having lost the Cold War and for its subsequent stage of geographic, demographic, economic and military

shrinking. The West not only gave Russia preferential treatment with millions of dollars in different foreign aid initiatives, but it also created institutional bridges in order to attract Moscow towards dialogue and Western practices. In the 1990s, what the members of NATO longed for was to have a “normal” Russia by their side. However, what we have ended up with is something very different and rather less reassuring.

Boris Yeltsin’s resignation in favor of Vladimir Putin in 2000 brought the democratic experiment in post-Soviet Russia to an end. In order to secure greater political control, the Kremlin would gradually undermine every force that could criticize its governing style, showing a vicious penchant against the mass media. Political stability through authoritarianism would be justified as a necessary evil in the name of economic recovery and the promotion of a new era of Russian growth.

The economic expansion did take place, mainly due to the rise in the price of crude oil as well as to the increase in the global demand of gas and petroleum – both commodities constitute the backbone of Russia’s exports. Nonetheless, this improvement has not translated in greater political freedom; the world has instead seen further degradation of democracy in the country. In spite of the fact that Russians enjoy greater individual freedom in comparison to the Soviet era, it is undeniable that today they enjoy less freedom than ten years ago.

Having free hands in the political landscape and accumulating benefits thanks to hydrocarbon sales, Kremlin leaders have been able to carry out more demanding and aggressive foreign policy initiatives regarding Europe and America in recent years. Convinced of its superior strength, with Europe dependent on Russian gas and petroleum; and with the United States busy in Iraq in the fight against Islamist terrorism and in political transition, Moscow might have thought that the time was ripe to stage a comeback onto the world scene as a superpower.

Be that as it may; whether Russia felt resented because it felt that the members of NATO did not take into consideration Russian points of view and interests – going from NATO expansion to the decisions on Kosovo – or due to a sense of frustrated national pride reemerging in the country, or because of the possibility of asserting its traditional regional interests, Moscow will certainly use the confrontation strategy whenever it serves its purposes. Russia’s attack against Georgia is another turn of the screw, resorting to violence and justifying it as a valid and legitimate method to defend Russian interests.

The Medvedev Doctrine

- 1. Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law;*
 - 2. The world should be multipolar;*
 - 3. Russia does not want confrontation with any other country;*
 - 4. Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country;*
 - 5. There are regions in which Russia has privileged interests.*
-

Watching its domestic behavior and its political model of “tutelary democracy” as well as its aggressive foreign conduct, it becomes patently evident that the dream to count on Russia as a normal and cooperative partner has vanished. Moscow is trying to impose as *fait accompli* the full recognition of its

Russia has currently border disputes with, among other countries, Japan (Kuril Islands), Georgia (Ossetia, Abkhazia), Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Caspian Sea), Norway (Barents Sea), Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine (Sea of Azov). Some disputes are rooted in history while others came about after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Some of them, as the one with Ossetia, have culminated recurring to the use of force.

right to have a sphere of influence – the space once enjoyed by the Soviets – and that we all must listen to what it has to say regarding important global issues. In order to achieve this goal, Moscow is ready to resort to any means it deems necessary — including arms sales to countries such as Syria and Iran, forging ties with Venezuela, blackmailing Europe via the gas weapon, and Russian rearmament.

Although nobody would find solace in the revival of the Cold War days, it is also true that if we allow Russian ambitions to continue growing unrestrained, the members of NATO will be facing not only very complex situations (e.g., the clear threat to the Baltic states) but

also the strategic milieu will be substantially altered in ten years’ time. Worse yet, it will go against Western interests, values and way of life. Europe, “free and one”, an Atlantic objective from the beginning of the 1990s cannot coexist with one Russia that operates using coercion, blackmail and intimidation as foreign policy tools.

The Alliance must find the right balance between dialogue and determination to deal with Moscow. It does not have to be impossible. After all, it is what the Atlantic Alliance successfully accomplished during the Cold War.

Iran: The Threats to Global Order

The same year that the Atlantic Alliance celebrates its 60th anniversary, the Islamic Republic of Iran celebrates the 30th anniversary of its creation. From the very beginning, Khomeini's Iran became a force whose prime objective was to export the fundamentalist revolution beyond its borders. If the leaders in Tehran have not been able to achieve the full completion of their project, it is not because they have abandoned it, but because they lack the means to carry it out. Nonetheless, during all these years, Iran has been extending its network in the Middle East through diverse groups, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or Hamas in Gaza; on numerous occasions, it has also been involved in terrorist activities outside the Gulf area.

In recent years, far from moderating its rhetoric and conduct, Iran has become more radical and aggressive. The 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad highlighted the boom of a political and religious elite with a vision of the world and a very extremist national project. Iran's oil revenues during these years – with oil prices skyrocketing – have allowed its leaders to uphold financially their political vision. This oil money has allowed this leadership not only to improve some of the country's security deficiencies, but also to rush to the aid of armed groups throughout the Levant region.

Worse yet, today it is obvious that Iran has been working at a feverish pace in a nuclear program whose ultimate logic resides in the Iranian need to have an atomic bomb. At the moment, no efforts taken by the international community, from dialogue to sanctions, have sufficed to force the ayatollahs to abandon their nuclear ambitions; therefore, in the absence of other more effective collective measures, it does not seem such a far-fetched thought to envision that, sooner rather than later, Iran will become an atomic power.

**Table V:
Recent Chronology of the Iranian Nuclear Program**

August 2002	The existence of two nuclear sites in Iran was revealed: Natanz, to enrich uranium, and Arak, to produce heavy water.
June 2003	The IAEA, after visiting Arak and Natanz, states that Iran is violating the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
September 2005	The IAEA announces that Iran has resumed uranium enrichment activities in Isfahan.
April 2006	Iran informs that it has managed to produce uranium enriched to 3.5 percent and decides to accelerate its nuclear program. The IAEA informs the UN Security Council that Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities.
July 2006	UN Security Council Resolution 1696 requests the suspension of all nuclear activities before August 31.
August 2006	The IAEA informs that Iran has not complied with Resolution 1696
December 2006	UN Security Council Resolution 1737 requests the suspension of all nuclear activities within sixty days.
February 2007	The IAEA informs that Iran has not complied with Resolution 1737.
March 2007	UN Security Council Resolution 1737 imposes trade and economic sanctions on Iran.
April 2007	Iran announces it is producing nuclear fuel and plans to install 50,000 centrifuges.
September 2007	Iran informs it now has 3000 uranium-enriching centrifuges at Natanz.
March 2008	UN Security Council Resolution 1803 imposes new sanctions on Iran.

Source: Iran Watch: Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

The implications of a nuclear Iran will have a deep impact in the strategic map of the world. The Iranian bomb would represent three complementary elements at the same time: a Persian bomb before the Arab world; a Shia bomb against Sunni Islam, and an Islamic revolutionary bomb in the face of Arab leaders – labeled as corrupt – and of the Western world, starting with Israel and ending with the United States – the so-called Great Satan.

To the extent that the defensive character of a nuclear weapon does not take precedence in the Iranian doctrine; that chances are Iran could put atomic elements at the disposal of terrorist groups; and that it will be extremely problematic to establish a relation of mutual deterrence with a strategic culture in which risk precedes stability, we are convinced that an atomic Iran will mean a major strategic revolution that will very negatively affect, not only the security of the Gulf region and the Middle East, but also the security of all NATO allies.

Islamist Terrorism: The Attack against Western Society

In our previous 2005 report, we endorsed the idea that Islamist terrorism represented an existential threat against our open, liberal, and democratic societies. Four years later, actually, eight years after the dramatic 9/11 attacks, we are still convinced that global jihadism is a threat that can endanger the Western way of life if it is not countered adequately.

Combat operations, missions by intelligence services, and increasing police attention to the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism have certainly helped to diminish al-Qaeda's operational capacity and, as a result, the intensity of its threat has decreased, too. Nevertheless, the attractive appeal of Islamist terrorism to a significant amount of Muslim youth, the persistence of recruiting networks, the relative ease to train them, and the religious ideological commitment to jihad, have made possible the increase of the Islamist terrorist threat around the world – though not necessarily the brand of bin Laden's al-Qaeda. Along this organization, there are now other groups coexisting as al-Qaeda franchises, for example, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or cells inspired by its example, but with local roots. A clear example of this domestic enterprise is Europe's particularly elevated intensity of its so-called "homegrown terrorism."

Although the Alliance has considered Islamist terrorism as one of the factors that affect the collective security of its members, state law-enforcement agencies actually carry the brunt of all anti-terrorist operations, at least in Europe, and, consequently, the scope of action belongs to the European Union. Four years ago, we thought that NATO had to develop a Homeland Security component to combat terrorism in an integrated and collective way; we still think that a collective and transatlantic approach is essential to prevail in the fight against jihadist terrorism.

Furthermore, we still think in order to defeat jihadism, the allies cannot rely exclusively on domestic police operations; they must also have the capacity to strike against terrorists wherever deemed necessary. Another important point is that the fight against terrorism does not end the fight against the terrorist. It is necessary to address the conditions that promote and favor the terrorist venture and serve as breeding ground. The previous American administration launched an ambitious plan to further political openness, economic liberalization and religious tolerance in the Muslim world, as a fundamental tool to end the culture of death and stop embracing violent feelings against the West. Unfortunately, this program never reached total completion and today radicalism continues to make inroads in the Arab world, Asia and part of Africa, as well as among Muslim immigrant populations in Europe.

To a certain extent, one can see a good measure of the rise of radicalism in Afghanistan's Taliban expansion during the last two years, which is causing so many problems to the NATO mission in that country and to the viability of the Afghan project headed by President Karzai.

In any event, the worst-case scenario will take place the day some terrorist group acquires mass destruction capabilities – in particular, a nuclear bomb, since it is the device that can generate the most damage with a single detonation. It is not misconceived to think of the latent possibility that Islamist terrorists get hold of a nuclear warhead and, in fact, we think this will happen sooner than expected if countries, such as Pakistan, are not stabilized.

**Table VI:
Successful and foiled terrorist attacks in NATO
countries since 2001**

	Foiled attempts:
2001	- U.S. Embassy (Paris) - Kleine Brogel military base (Belgium) - Commercial airliner (London)
2002	Foiled plot against U.S. Embassy (Rome)
	Foiled attempts:
2003	- NATO base (Verona) - Paris Subway
	Attacks: Truck bombs in Istanbul (57 dead)
	Foiled attempts:
2004	- Bluewater Shopping Center (Kent), pub and gas plot (London) - Subway C.C., DST (Paris), Orly Airport - Church of San Petronio (Bologna), Milan Subway - Old Trafford Stadium (Manchester) - National Court of Spain (Madrid)
	Successful attempts: Theo Van Gogh's murder (Amsterdam), Madrid train attacks (191 dead)
2005	Terrorist attacks against London's transportation system (56 dead); new plot foiled
	Foiled attempts:
2006	- Plot against 10 commercial airliners between the U.K and the U.S.; commercial airliner in Frankfurt, - Attack against a synagogue (Prague); Truck bombs against Canada's Parliament building. Failed terrorist bomb attack on two German trains in Cologne
	Foiled attempts:
2007	- Kidnapping and murder of soldiers (UK), plot to bomb Fort Dix (USA), Nørreport train station (Denmark) - Bus bomb in shopping center (Ankara)
	Successful attacks:
	- Ankara, (7 dead) - Car bomb Piccadilly Circus (London), Glasgow Airport
2008	Foiled attempt: Barcelona Subway Bomb attack in Istanbul (17 dead)

The Threat of Proliferation

During decades, the number of countries equipped with nuclear weapons has remained relatively limited. In the last five years, however, nuclear ambitions seem to have burst irrepressibly and today an increasing number of nations are preparing themselves, or are already prepared, to become nuclear powers. North Korea, India, and Pakistan are very well-known cases; we have already mentioned Iran's case; in September 2008, we all found out about Syria's case after Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear plant under construction; Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have shown their interest in atomic issues, just as Algeria or Libya did back in time. In the Western world, the capability to go from civil to military programs is within the power of more than twenty countries.

In many cases, the advances achieved in nuclear science are well known, but in many other occasions, progress has been unexpected. In other words, the control mechanisms initiated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have proven absolutely insufficient to prevent proliferation in those cases when countries are determined to embark on the nuclear journey. Nothing suggests that the next revision of the Treaty would improve the measures for more effective verification and control.

Furthermore, taking into account the increasingly adverse conditions of security in many zones, we are completely convinced that the pressure felt in these regions to acquire nuclear capabilities will bring about a new wave of proliferation in the short to mid term, making the world poly-nuclear. Regional dynamics will be transformed in those places where nuclear arms pop up, adding more instability and risks in case of conflict. Today no one can assure that a nuclear attack between India and Pakistan is an unimaginable possibility or that, if Iran becomes an atomic power, a war between Iran and Israel would not be peppered with nuclear devices.

"The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."

*The World at Risk
The Report of the Commission on the Prevention
of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism 2008*

On the other hand, the fact that today there are more states on their way to become nuclear powers increases the possibility of terrorist groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction – particularly those organizations most interested in ensuring maximum destructive capacity. Nuclear weaponry is a highly desirable objective for groups such as al-Qaeda, yet this fact must not distract our attention from other methods that can also quench their penchant for destruction; such is the case of biological and chemical agents, less lethal than nuclear ones, but much easier to obtain and to use.

Even if NATO were to consider that it has no enemies, its global presence entails that a part of its deployments will take place in theaters of operations


where there might be weapons of mass destruction – a fact that would affect *per se* mission plans and estimates as well as the way to conduct all operations.

Finally, not only do we think that the possibility of having to live in a poly-nuclear world is increasingly real and near, but we are also sure that, taking into account the different national strategic cultures and the combination of intervening state and non-state actors, there is an increasingly higher probability that a nuclear weapon ends up being used.

Global Recession and Collective Security

It is a proven fact that democracies tend to reduce defense expenditures as soon as they perceive that threats decrease. Between 1989 and 1994 – the years in which the end of the Cold War was being celebrated – the military budgets of NATO member states were on average reduced by more than twenty percent.

In recent years, military spending had stopped dropping in most of the NATO area, but the increase in operations, the desirable transformation of the military, the increase in personnel costs of professional armies and galloping inflation in defense goods, were factors that clearly indicated the need to boost defense spending in a sustained way. Yet, very few among the allies have reached the objective to invest over two percent of GDP in their own security.



Source: NATO

It is a paradox that during the years when Western economies have experienced higher economic growth, their defense budgets have not undergone a proportional increase. Thus, in a world that has continued spending in defense and military equipment, the cost faced by the allies has not stopped its decrease in relative terms, in spite that they have had to pay for expensive operations in recent years, as it can be observed in the following table.


**Table VII:
Proportion of World Military Expenditure**

	1988	2007
NATO – Europe	23.5%	21%
USA	35%	37%

Source: SIPRI Yearbook (Several editions)

In the absence of a clear threat perceived in the same fashion, intensity, and reach by a majority of NATO members, in addition to a markedly negative economic situation – we are enduring the first global recession of our history – it is going to become extremely complicated to keep the present and already insufficient levels of military spending. Worse yet, we believe that many allies will start considering the need to undertake budget adjustments and cuts in their defense investment.

Defense costs will then tend to contract at the same level as the general economy contracts. Nevertheless, the recession and an increase in unemployment can help to end the diverse recruitment problems that allied professional armies had been experiencing during the last decade. Between unemployment and serving in the armed forces, this second option can become more attractive.



Source: NATO

On the contrary, investment in equipment and acquisitions will tend to decrease progressively, which in turn will delay the execution of equipment programs. The impact to NATO's global capacities and the improvement of certain issues found in this area is, today more than ever, an open question. However, since the Alliance already has certain difficulties in carrying out successive capability commitments, we are convinced that it is not realistic to expect the allies to be able to reach their acquisitions and modernization goals in the coming years.

If no cooperative and imaginative measures are taken in order to reduce the impact of the economic crisis in the budget of member states, their collective defense capabilities will suffer.

This would be less serious if all countries could adapt to the present negative economic reality in the same way, but history has repeatedly demonstrated that authoritarian countries are able to impose what we consider unbearable restrictions on their populations in order to keep or increase their military power. In a sense, if the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian plans of

modernization continue as planned, the world's military balance will be increasingly problematic for the Western allies.

Furthermore, it is also a fact that the cost of defense against irregular forces and non-state actors fully exceeds the effort that those groups must make to carry out their plans. We do not expect any reduction of the present threat and it would be very dangerous to cut programs related to terrorism and asymmetric threats.

Demographic Deficit and Allied Defense

Today we know for sure that, except for a few cases, the population of NATO countries will undergo a demographic crisis motivated by two phenomena: the drop in fertility rates and increased life expectancy. In the next four decades, most of the allies will have to count on populations smaller than the present ones. Only the United States will grow in a significant way, going from three hundred to almost four hundred million by the year 2050. In NATO-Europe, growth will basically concentrate in three countries: United Kingdom, France, and Turkey – though compared to American numbers, it will be numerically very low.

The issue of the possible geostrategic, economic and social implications of such a deep and accelerated crisis remains an open question; it will largely depend on the responses that governments provide regarding this phenomenon. In any case, it is possible to say unmistakably that Western populations – particularly Europe's population – will continue shrinking in relative terms to world population (twenty-four percent in 1980; eighteen percent in 2009; and sixteen percent in 2025). It is also a certainty that the age average will see a remarkable increase, which will translate in serious difficulties to keep up with social costs in healthcare and pensions. Western societies will largely depend on immigrant flows to maintain their production capacities.

In any case, since defense is a social function and part of society, it will also experience the effects of the demographic crisis in a significant way – in the NATO zone, mainly its European side, because if young people are on their way to become scarce, it is not difficult to imagine that, in turn, military recruitment will be increasingly complex to manage. Excluding the United States, the United Kingdom, and, to a lesser extent, France, the recruitment niche, that is to say, the swath of population between 17 and 30 years of age, will tend to decrease – in some cases in an alarming way.


Thus, for example, in 1990, Germany had a population of sixteen million young people who were between 18 and 29 years old; in the year 2060, they will number only nine million. Italy, which had twelve million in 1990, will only have seven million within fifty years; Poland will go from eight to four million during the same period of time; Spain will also see trimmed its recruitment niche by almost fifty percent in the next decades.

As a consequence of these demographic changes, societies will not only have more people outside the military recruiting age (four to one in 1950, five to one in the 2010, and 6.3 to one in 2050), but will have a decreasing recruitment niche. This is particularly alarming if one considers that the "recruitment rate," that is to say, the number of young people who enter the military regarding the recruitment niche, in other words, regarding the swath of potential and officially recruitable age, has stayed relatively stable in the main NATO countries during the last years – around 0.2 percent, regardless of economic circumstances. All this only means that, unless the proportion of young people interested in joining the military increases significantly, the military will face a sharp drop in real

recruitment, which will be proportional to the demographic drop and recruitment niche.

Since the current political culture prevailing in Europe avoids placing military life and the service in the armed forces among the desirable preferences of its citizens and, in the absence of a much more aggressive human resources strategy, it is difficult to imagine that these armies will be able to compensate for the declining proportion of young people available. Therefore, we can also expect to see a trend of decreasing troop levels.

The next graph presents different scenarios regarding military recruitment capabilities that illustrate this trend (The pessimist, 0.2; the average, 0.25 percent; and the optimist, 0.3 percent).




*excluding Turkey

— Average scenario
- - - - - Pessimistic scenario
..... Optimistic scenario

The strategic dilemma for the allies lies in having to manage armies – more than probably facing troop reductions – in a moment when they must carry out an increasing number of missions abroad and in an environment where the demand and the need for these operations are not going to decrease – right on the contrary, they will face an increase.

On the other hand, and considering that there will be substantial demographic variations among the allies, one wonders to what extent the differential of troop availability can generate internal tensions within the Alliance, since those countries having more manpower will be pressed to contribute more.




Germany-Spain-France-Italy-United Kingdom-Avg. NATO-Eur-USA

Finally, the clear demographic divergence between both sides of the Atlantic, and the noticeable aging of European populations belonging to NATO countries could also give way to disparate attitudes regarding armies and the use of the force, which could aggravate the internal tensions of the Alliance.

Post-War Culture and NATO

Politics and its institutions depend on culture, and cinema is nowadays the best expression of culture. In Alfred Hitchcock's film *Indiscreet* (1958), starring Ingrid Bergman and Cary Grant, he plays the role of a man that goes to work at NATO headquarters – still located in Paris during those days. He travels to London on weekends since she lives there. In one film scene, Bergman introduces Grant to a friend, saying that he works for NATO, to which the friend responds "What an admirable institution!" It was the years of the Cold War when friends and foes were clearly defined and the collective defense effort was publicly and artistically appreciated.

In our current culture, that film scene would be absolutely impossible to produce. Public support for NATO oscillates depending on the events and, in the best case scenario, it does not amount to sixty percent, which, we must admit, is higher than expected since it is a society that does not usually value its military, It is also a society reluctant to the use of force and opposed to all wars.



Source: <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/>

Actually, the fact that fifty-seven percent of Europeans consider NATO an essential institution, according to the *2008 Transatlantic Trends* public opinion survey, is something that can lead to misunderstandings. Of all the possible threats suggested by this survey, Europeans always showed a lower perception of risk or urgency regarding these threats. Yet, there was a unique exception; climate change, in which Europeans surpassed Americans in the valuation of the danger that this phenomenon represents. In all other

respects, from terrorism to nuclear proliferation – even in regards to a more aggressive Russia – they scored below Americans.

This is coherent with another survey regarding the use of force and conducted by the Pew Institute. Thus, when asked about support for combat operations in Afghanistan, seventy-three percent of Americans were in favor in contrast with only forty-three percent of Europeans.

In fact, there has been a growing rift between both sides of the Atlantic and among the Europeans on essential aspects regarding the life of the Atlantic Alliance – by the way, an issue about which the media is conspicuously silent and that is never brought up in political debates. For example, concerning the legitimacy of the use of force, Europe has slowly introduced a new parliamentary practice to approve the shipment of troops abroad, whatever the nature of the mission. Furthermore, in spite of the experience after Operation Allied Force over

Kosovo as well as after the intervention in Iraq and the internal division of the allies, today Europe desperately seeks that the United Nations would legitimize all NATO combat operations with a Security Council resolution. This is a feature that marks a clear difference between the approaches of the Atlantic partners. The Americans believe that the only relevant factor is national sovereignty expressed through the executive and legislative branches. A UN resolution sanctioning the measure is “nice to have,” but in no measure becomes *conditio sine qua non* as the majority of the Europeans pretend.

In the same fashion, there is a rift regarding when and how is appropriate to use force, beyond the institutional legitimacy on which one may count. Although the right to self-defense is guaranteed, the measures that can be put in practice to guarantee that right are, nonetheless, subject to debate. Thus, when the *2002 National Security Strategy of the*

United States of America dealt with preemptive and preventive actions, the Europeans reacted very negatively. The right to protect, developed by the UN, has not raised the unanimous support of the international community, either – not even among the allies, prudent before a limitless expansion of missions to come.

In regards to the normative approach, there are substantial differences between America, Europe and among Europeans. On the one hand, there is a natural rejection to suffer casualties in one’s own ranks. However, this type of rejection has become a real obsession in respect to peace and humanitarian missions – to the point that one is indeed under the impression that the reasons behind the engagement are feeble or that they do not have the necessary social support. Likewise, in these kinds of missions, developed to end an open conflict between third parties, errors that provoke civilian casualties or collateral damage are also deemed unacceptable. The culture of “zero losses” determines the tactical way on how to conduct operations, as we saw in the bombings over Kosovo in 1999 and now in Afghanistan. In fact, some of the allies that do not accept any civilian casualties at all have criticized harshly and unfairly the most aggressive tactics employed by combat forces in this country.

This new strategic culture, that in Europe is the result of a post-war society, which considers that there are few things worth fighting for and even less worth dying for, is totally inadequate for the type of missions that, in the immediate future, the military must confront in asymmetric conflicts. Not everything can be done with air missions; ground forces will have to play a relevant role. Casualties will be inevitable and ever-rising due to higher exposure to danger. There is also the issue of a not so easily distinguishable enemy among civilians and regular forces, since the new enemy has no uniforms, emblems or insignias. They are irregular enemy combatants, seeking to camouflage and hide among non-

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. .

Charter of the United Nations

combatant civilians in most cases; therefore, the appearance of collateral damage will also increase. Consequently, rejection to war will increase and the support to participate in multilateral operations will decrease – particularly when the public does not understand the reasons of a conflict or the participation of national forces in it.

Today it is obviously clear that there is growing and evident public fatigue in regards to Afghanistan. This fatigue will be a constant with which NATO will have to struggle in future operations if it wants to count with the necessary time to succeed. A dynamic and effective communications policy could reduce the negative impact of operations on public opinion.

A More Unstable, Threatening and Dangerous World

At the beginning of 2009, the world is not the place Westerners imagined at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Instead of being a calm and benign place, in which peace, stability, and prosperity had prevailed, we are immersed in a very different reality, in which dangers, threats, confrontation, war and poverty still play a determining role in our lives.

Once more, it is fashionable to speak about the American decline and the emergence of a multi-polar world. We think that this notion is just another fad, and, just as with all fads, this one will be fleeting, too. Furthermore, as the current economic crisis suggests, if there is a nation on Earth able to ride out the storm, that is America – neither Europe nor China.

Regarding this issue, in the first place, we do not believe that a multi-polar world is on its way, at least for the coming decades. Nevertheless, we do see a plural world regarding the number and the nature of actors on the world stage: No longer will there be only nation-states and multinational institutions, there also will be subnational actors, non-governmental organizations, corporations, individuals with great power, and terrorist groups. It is the new multiplicity – not the dispersal of power among some national poles. Naturally, this makes the international system less stable and more prone to confrontation.

In the second place, the world is more dangerous due to the spread of technological and military advances, which are turning groups or institutions that never before had been able to represent a serious threat, into lethal dangers now. The day that some terrorist puts his hands on a weapon of mass destruction, we will finally understand in a dramatic way what this really means. Meanwhile, we must face the onslaught of an array of modern devices that are being shrewdly exploited against us. Cyberspace is one of the most assailed areas and there is a remarkable persistence of attacks taking place against it and through it.

In the third place, we are entering a more dangerous world because some of our enemies use religious beliefs to justify their actions – though derived from a distorted interpretation of a concrete religion, Islam. Western societies and their institutions, including the military, are badly equipped to understand and to react to this phenomenon. Although we know how to act against terrorists from a security paradigm, as well as how to devise measures to lessen the impact of Islamist extremism, we still cannot handle the direct and unacceptable nexus between both phenomena. In turn, this makes that the threat of radical Islam and Islamist terrorism does not decrease in global terms.

The uncertainty fostered by the current global economic crisis and its impact not only on prosperous societies, but also on developing ones, can accentuate the fragility of systems, regimes and nations lacking resources to ensure their viability. The number of failing and failed states will increase – with all the human and security consequences these situations entail.

The outlook is worrisome if, to all of the above, we add the resurgence of conflicts motivated by old principles of geopolitics, the globalization of conflict in all spheres of human activity – from cyberspace to courts of justice – and the increasing inability of our institutions and devices to stand up to this accumulation of challenges, risks and threats.

The West needs to defend itself and, in order to do just that, it must obtain resources and inspiration wherever it finds them – and urgently, before it is too late. The Atlantic Alliance is the best option we have in order to go on the right path. Failing to take advantage of it would mean to have a more unstable and threatening world.

HOW TO MODERNIZE NATO

I. A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

It is a paradox, but the more missions NATO undertakes, the more confused its members seem to be about the intention and nature of its collective bonds. Currently the allies are more active than ever, with missions as disparate as logistical support for the African Union (AU), training mission in Iraq, stabilization in Kosovo or combat in Afghanistan. However, it has been impossible to reach an agreement on a new strategic concept or to accept how to share the load of all these tasks evenly. NATO seems to have lost its course because it is trapped in the management of its operations and under great pressure in Afghanistan. At this moment, the Alliance still does not know very well what the commitment of collective defense enshrined in Article 5 means and implies. The Alliance still does not find the spheres where it belongs according to its activities in a globalized world. The Alliance still has not been able to find a way to confront the challenges that a resurgent Russia represents. The Alliance still does not know how to reach a firm understanding on how to continue with its policy of expansion. And the Alliance still has not harmoniously developed the military capabilities upon which its members had agreed.

In spite of it all and although all the allies, without exception, are being affected by the current grave economic crisis, which will have serious repercussions for their investments in defense, we think that the 60th Anniversary Summit in April 2009 opens a series of possibilities and the Alliance could finally adopt a strategic change of course. For openers, two elements seem highly propitious: the promises of President Barack H. Obama's new American administration and the possibility that, thanks to the personal engagement of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, France rejoins the allied military structures as just any other member.

The New American Administration and NATO

It was no secret that many European citizens and leaders, longed for a change of administration in the United States. In spite of having improved transatlantic relations during his last three years in office, many of the fundamental differences between the discourse of President George W. Bush and the one of a sizeable number of the European allies persisted – though now these disagreements would be quietly conveyed. Although the days of deep and open crises due to the 2003 intervention in Iraq has been left behind, the Bucharest Summit in April 2008 was one more proof of the differences on both sides of the Atlantic regarding issues very important for the Alliance as, for example, its expansion or the anti-missile defense system.

For that reason, Obama's rise to power was generally received as good news. It is so much so that even small gestures, such as the offer of a new tone in the transatlantic relationship announced by US Vice President Joseph Biden during the

45th Munich Security Conference, were received with great hope by the distinguished audience and as the prelude of a new era for the NATO allies – regardless of the fact that the change in foreign policy adduced by the new Administration was rather devoid of content.

In any case and, acknowledging that it is too soon to offer an assessment of the new American plan regarding foreign policy and security issues since it is still on the drawing board, some of the approaches presented by the new president and his closest advisers have pleased the Europeans. If this good climate and nice reciprocal attitudes were to continue, it would be beneficial for NATO and useful to advance a basic member agreement about the threats afflicting the allies. It would also be the best form to organize a defense against those threats – in other words, to forge a common vision on the nature and the purpose of the Alliance, on how to pursue its objectives and the means to achieve them.

Thus, for example, the unwillingness of the Obama Administration to use the concept “War on Terror” fits very well with the constant complaint of many allies about the militarist overtones of this expression. Other examples are the announced closing of the detention center at Guantanamo Bay, which soothes the critics in Europe questioning its legality; abandoning the concept of “preemptive actions” formalized in the *2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, puts an end to a permanent concern among the allies; the announcement of a more-open-to-dialogue diplomacy with friends and adversaries; as well as constant consultation with America’s allies. These are all gestures that augur to fill the void where Europeans felt uncomfortable.

Now, for all these expectations to be fulfilled, to see unilateralism abandoned, aggressiveness reduced and prevention instruments boosted, NATO allies must be able to work jointly – and they will certainly have to work more. As Biden has made clear; “America will do more, but it will also ask more from her partners.”

In regards to the Alliance, the priorities, at the moment, seem to go towards the goal to stabilize Afghanistan, to hinder Iran from getting atomic devices, to look for a good and positive relation with Russia – but without having to recognize Russian aspirations to getting a sphere of influence, nor freezing NATO’s expansion process – and to continue, in an concerted way, with the deployment of anti-missile defense systems.

If these objectives are pursued in smoother fashion and velvet diplomacy is used to ease differences, the new Administration will be in an ideal position to lead to its allies and to forge that collective vision that NATO so badly needs. Yet, we insist, it is a window of opportunity, it is not necessarily a reality. Much will depend on how the European allies respond and that the results of their commitments please all the parties involved. Otherwise, this new American administration will most probably go back to approaches similar to those applied on previous years. America will look for consensus, but it will go alone when it deems it indispensable.

France: The Return of the Prodigal Son?

Ever since General De Gaulle forcefully removed France from NATO's integrated structures, arguing that one thing was the Alliance – or the pact among nations – and another one was the Organization, France has been an “anomalous” ally. Not so much because the country was outside the military structures, but because it represented and, simultaneously, defended, an alternative vision of what NATO should be. To counter American leadership, Paris pretended to have an autonomous European military power.

In fact, the French return to NATO's military structures will be achieved thanks to France's current president Nicolas Sarkozy, who has expressed on many occasions the French desire to be in NATO as just any other member, with full rights and no limitations. Nonetheless, all this process started in 1995, when France decided to send a representative to the Military Committee and, continued in 2004, when it sent two high-ranking officials to both allied strategic commands. At the moment, France has a little over two-hundred military personnel in NATO, serving as “liaison officers” and it is only fair to acknowledge that their contribution to the Alliance's missions is ample – with about five thousand soldiers participating in them.

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- *To my mind, things are clear: it's European Defense and NATO, not European Defense or NATO. Both together. It's because we are going to strengthen European Defense that NATO will have to be strengthened. It was a major error for people to think that by weakening one they could strengthen the other. I accept responsibility for this political choice which hasn't been such an easy one in France up until now.*
 - *But the alliance with the United States and the alliance with Europe don't undermine my country's independence; they strengthen my country's independence. That's what I'll explain to the French when the time comes. This moment is drawing nearer. I'm convinced that France can upgrade her relations with NATO while being an independent ally and a free partner of the United States.*
 - *It's doubtless time to review NATO's strategy and for France and Germany to accept a number of the consequences.*

Nicolas Sarkozy at the 45 Munich Security Conference
February 2008

It is true that for the current development of NATO missions, it is not so relevant to be part of the chain of command and integrated structures since there are many countries that make significant contributions without even belonging to the Alliance, as it is the case of Australia in Afghanistan. That fact does not diminish the importance of the decision taken by the current French president. It represents a double acknowledgment of something that French strategic thinking did not accept until now: First of all, that the new global environment requires greater efforts and solidarity among the allies – including France – and, secondly, that the European defense cannot be built clashing with NATO and Atlantic security.

In fact, the leap that Nicolas Sarkozy has dared to make represents an end to the eternal tensions that

have taken place in the Alliance due to these two opposing visions. NATO needs now more than ever to have a single and unique strategic vision. The possibilities opened by the French rapprochement – as long as it all takes place maintaining a positive spirit and not as a means of advancing France's previous theses – are very relevant to accomplish the reshaping of NATO in order to better meet the challenges the organization must face.

Now, we want to emphasize the constructive side of the French return. Yet, until very recently, France has continued showing deep disagreements with some of the allied policies. For example, it firmly opposed NATO's takeover of counterterrorism issues; it has systematically refused that the deployment of NATO Response Force in missions outside the framework of Article 5; it has harshly criticized any suggestion of NATO's transformation into a global alliance by adding new, non-European members; it has been vehemently opposed to putting Georgia and Ukraine on the path to membership, among other things; and it has denied NATO the possibility to encompass tasks beyond collective defense and peace support missions. Will France, once totally integrated, have a new attitude? It would be highly desirable.

As we have indicated, in purely operative and military terms, the French comeback to the integrated structures of the Alliance has little practical importance. However, the truly relevant issues here are its symbolism and its politically-loaded significance. All the allies will benefit if France uses this decision wisely and becomes an agent of change in the transformation of the Alliance and European defense – currently an impotent force, unable to operate autonomously today without endangering European security, allied solidarity and the relationship with the United States.

France's comeback to NATO does not seek just to cover positions in military commands and it should not be seen that way. It is and it will be important in terms of strategic convergence, depending on how much France is willing and prepared to work in favor of a common project with the allies.

Afghanistan: The Obstacle

Afghanistan has become the cause and the consequence of the many problems afflicting the Atlantic Alliance. When NATO took over ISAF's responsibilities in August 2003, the Alliance's mission consisted of supporting the Afghan government to reinforce security and to reconstruct the country. The mission's initial tasks were limited to the capital area, Kabul, but at the end of that same year, it expanded throughout Afghan territory. In those days, the flashpoints of armed violence opposing the Afghan government and openly against the allied forces were rather few, poorly organized and did not represent more than a local threat. The Atlantic allies worked in a relatively benign environment and it was commonly accepted that in spite of the levels of violence endured at the time, the set objectives could be accomplished. The allies could not be more wrong.

Ever since, Afghanistan has become a strategic problem that threatens NATO's feasibility and its future. For starters, the levels of troop deployment in Afghanistan have proved woefully insufficient to accomplish the mission successfully in order to guarantee security – and without security, the Afghan reconstruction is not possible. It is true that the Alliance's leadership quickly identified this deficiency, but in most cases, member states have not been able or willing to walk the extra mile. For instance, in 2004, the Secretary General urged members to increase ISAF troop levels – only Poland heeded the call. In the recent Bucharest Summit, only France chose to reinforce its Afghan contingent with one thousand more soldiers. At the end of the last year, President Bush decided to increase the presence of American troops with two additional brigades – a decision that has not been revoked by President Obama who, in fact, could deploy two more brigades in Afghanistan before the summer.

It was absolutely obvious that NATO's troop presence in Afghanistan was poor. Never before had a mission been carried out with so few troops. It was an ambitious enterprise in terms of objectives, territory and population. If, for example, one were to use the standards applied in Bosnia, ISAF should have had a minimum of four hundred thousand troops deployed from the very beginning of the mission.

Table VIII: Comparison of Peak International Troop Deployment Strength

Location	Peak Number of International Troops	International Troops per km	International Troops per person
Bosnia	60,000	1 per 0.85km	1 per 66
Kosovo	40,000	1 per 0.3km	1 per 50
East Timor	9,000	1 per 1.6km	1 per 111
Irak 2004	155,000	1 per 2.8km	1 per 161
Afghanistan ISAF 2004	6,000	1 per 25km	1 per 1,115

Source: M. Bhatia, K. Lanigan and P. Wilkinson, "Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan," Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004. En Smith, J.: What Lies Beneath: The Future of NATO through the ISAF Prism, CSIS 2008.


The difficulties met to reinforce ISAF's troop deployment strength increased steadily as insurgencies of all stripes – Taliban, warlords, opium dealers, tribal lords – escalated the number of attacks and, consequently, the number of allied troop casualties grew. In addition, the increase in the number of attacks did not affect NATO troops evenly. For a long time, most of the violent and organized attacks mainly affected the eastern and southern areas of the country; the rest of the country was spared the toughest confrontations. Many allies showed little disposition to engage in combat – sometimes shielded behind a restrictive reading of ISAF's tasks – created a clear and harmful disparity between those who were essentially dedicated to reconstruction tasks and those who had to engage in combat.

The result could not have been more deplorable. Not only have the casualties steadily increased in these two last years, but also the weak fighting spirit of the NATO forces to combat in and for Afghanistan. Thus, the members' commitments to send more helicopters and fixed-wing aircrafts have never been

fulfilled and the complaints about military deficiencies have become a litany on the NATO Secretary General's lips. Even worse, the lack of troops and equipment, plus the restrictions imposed on the use of their troops by many of ISAF's members, are at the core of a burgeoning in guerrilla and Taliban insurgency currently devastating Afghan territory.

According to information reported by *CNN*, which is based on NATO documentation, the attacks to allied convoys increased thirty percent in 2008; the attacks throughout the country increased thirty-one percent; US and NATO troop deaths rose twenty-six percent; and Afghan civilian deaths rose sixty percent. These statistics reflect what has been happening in the area.

British Casualty Monitor: *Tracking the war in Afghanistan*



From the beginning, Afghanistan was depicted as the “good war,” not only because it enjoyed public support. It was legitimized by the terrible September 11 attacks; it had the commendable objective to contribute to the reconstruction of a country devastated by decades of wars, excesses, and anarchy; it had the United Nations “seal of approval” with an explicit mandate, but most of all, it was used politically to contrast with the Iraq intervention. However, few observers, at least in Europe, saw it as a proper war. The fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists was a problem for the Americans and their Operation Enduring Freedom. ISAF was another thing. For that reason, when the distinction between supporting the reconstruction mission and combating the insurgency becomes blurred, the reluctance to accept sacrifices grow – even the level of reluctance is variable, which further aggravates the tensions among the allies.

If these differences among the allies persist and if the Europeans are not able to contribute more, the disparities will steadily increase; consequently, that growing rift will ultimately divide the allies from one another and NATO-Europe from the United States. NATO cannot lose the war in Afghanistan because it would

mark its demise and the Americans cannot win this war on their own. It would not be the death of the Alliance, but of the hope to revitalize it.

Table IX: Casualties in Afghanistan

Afghan troops killed:	11,017	Afghan troops seriously injured:	33,051
Afghan civilians killed:	7,373	Afghan civilians seriously injured:	13,271
US troops killed:	574	U.S. troops seriously injured:	1,722
Other coalition troops killed:	484	Other coalition troops seriously injured:	1,452
Contractors killed:	75	Contractors seriously injured:	2,428
Journalists killed:	6	Journalists seriously injured:	unknown
Total killed in Afghanistan:	19,529	Total injured in Afghanistan:	51,924

HOW TO MODERNIZE NATO

II. AN ACTION PLAN

We believe in the Atlantic Alliance. We think that not only has it played an essential role ensuring our security during decades and, more recently, extending the area of stability in the world, but, as a modern collective defense organization, it is called to occupy a central place in the maintenance of our security and the world's. Yet, the Alliance must take a leap forward. If the summit to celebrate its 60th anniversary becomes one more exercise of trying to make the best out of a bad situation and propping up the bureaucratic mentality of "business as usual," we are utterly convinced that NATO will head for a marginal existence that could damage future world stability. If, on the contrary, it chooses to adapt to the needs of the new strategic environment, which is now global and more dangerous, the organization will continue being the backbone of Atlantic security – with the possibility of expanding the freedom and prosperity zone to neighboring areas.

The Strategic Studies Group details below a series of proposals that the allies should adopt to make NATO the defense organization that we all need. These proposals are diverse in nature and scope, but taken as a whole, they embark the Alliance on the right course to become the NATO 3.0 that we advocate.

1. Afghanistan: A Strategy for Victory

In the first place, it is unquestionable that the Afghan government is besieged by an array of forces – the most dangerous are Mullah Omar's Taliban and the al-Qaeda terrorists. NATO troops have engaged them and other random groups in combat with relative success: They can be tactically clobbered, but they are not defeated. It is impossible to contemplate victory with current troop levels. The new American administration has understood this need clearly; therefore, it is ready to repeat the "surge" policy that reaped such good results in Iraq. However, an additional effort on the part of the European allies to provide troops and equipment is necessary. The United States can assume the leadership, but it does not have to be the only country significantly increasing the number of troops and assuming the risks of combat.

In the second place, ISAF's contingent increase is urgent, but so is the change of attitude of many countries that have deployed troops in Afghanistan. The allies have focused during these years in going from defensive and static structures and doctrines to armies displaying power projection capabilities to stay abroad during prolonged periods of time. The moment has come to tackle another aspect of the Alliance's transformation: Going from peace support operations and peacekeeping missions to offensive missions and combat actions. Member states should give free hands to their military commanders in the theater of operations so that they can use all the elements at hand under their command and in the way they deem most appropriate – without applying restrictions or hindering mobility.

In the third place, the multinational forces have been fundamentally dedicated to protection and counterterrorist fighting. It is necessary to urgently start applying counterinsurgency strategies – with all that entails. For example, more ground troops and less emphasis on air missions; greater attention to collateral damage; greater protection of rural areas and cities; dialogue and cooperation with local leaders; incentives for all groups that do not belong to the radical insurgency and that might be interested in re-integrating into the system.

In the fourth place, NATO must accept that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by operating only within the borders of Afghanistan. The borders with Iran and Pakistan must be guarded and controlled. Furthermore, Afghanistan will not be stable if insurgents find refuge and logistical support in wide areas of Pakistan. In a sense, without the cooperation of Islamabad and without greater effectiveness of its forces in the fight against terrorism and the Taliban on Pakistani soil, all the strategy for Afghanistan is doomed beforehand to failure. For that reason, NATO should contemplate a support mission to help Pakistan with more effective counterterrorism strategies by supplying equipment, but above all, education and training.

And finally, the military effort must go together with greater dedication to the national reconstruction by pertinent civil institutions such as the United Nations, reconstruction funds and NGOs. It is not NATO's task, but the governments of member states should make sure that other international organisms heed the call of Afghanistan.

In any case, only victory will do. NATO must never be happy with less, under any circumstances. Understanding that victory is the viability of a central government and a political system based on pluralism and tolerance. Defining victory any other way – such as, by lowering standards – in order to get out of Afghanistan and thinking “the sooner, the better,” would be to betray NATO; besides, an embarrassed, baffled public opinion would never understand it.

2. Russia: Defense against Intimidation

The Alliance must not fall into the trap of provocation and avoid at all costs generating a new Cold War environment with Russia. Yet, at the same time, NATO must know how to show that it does not give in to either blackmail or intimidation; it must make the Russian leadership understand that the decisions affecting NATO activities and its future cannot be hostage to the will of the Kremlin. The members of the Alliance, taken one by one, can be weak compared to the Russian giant – particularly the Europeans due to their energy dependence – thus, for that reason the most urgent issue is to design a common policy about how to act regarding Russia. About it, we propose a two-way standard already outlined: Dialogue, but firmness.

The Alliance must be able to guarantee its commitment of solidarity with all members, including the new ones – that are usually the ones feeling first hand Russia's pressure. For that, we offer three complementary measures:

- a) First, the Alliance should resume its regular planning, scenarios that affect collective security and Article 5 in Europe. This kind of planning, by the way, was emblematic of NATO during decades, but it was abandoned some years ago;
- b) Second, the Alliance should transfer part of its infrastructures, including some second-level command, to Central European grounds. During all the Cold War, the best expression of solidarity was the presence of troops and infrastructures on allied soil. It is not any different today. It is necessary to move part of NATO eastwards;
- c) Third, to start combined and joint multinational military exercises in the countries of the new members. No NATO country should have its doors closed to this kind of training or to temporary troop deployments. These doors have not been closed in the past; they should not be closed today, either.

Experience has it that speaking and reaching important agreements with Moscow can be better accomplished by exhibiting firmness than weakness. The relationship between NATO and Russia must be constructive; it is in everybody's interest that Moscow carries out its business rationally and as a nation that respects international norms. However, this positioning should not be interpreted as a policy of capitulation. The Alliance must not acknowledge the post-Soviet space as Russia's sphere of influence, which Moscow arrogates *de facto* to itself. Nor must it stay on the sidelines regarding the debate on the admission of Georgia and Ukraine to the Alliance just because Russia is against it. If both countries comply with the requirements as defined by the Alliance, they should be invited to join the organization if they want it so. NATO expansion should only be defined by meritocracy and not subject to the will of the Kremlin.

3. Iran: Stop Proliferation

Due to absurd political reasons, NATO has not discussed the Iran issue and has avoided playing an active role to stop the Iranian nuclear program. The Alliance must change attitude because if Iran succeeds in its pursuit of the nuclear bomb, the security of all member states will suffer. Therefore, firstly, the Iran issue must take center stage in the worries and deliberations of the allies and must be reflected in the daily routine of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

Secondly, NATO must reinforce its deterrence capability and show its support to all diplomatic actions that sanction the Tehran regime by sending naval forces to the Gulf as a routine operation of naval training. Some members already do it and – as in the French case – the military presence in the area includes combat aircrafts. There is no reason to complain; what members-states do individually, the Alliance can do collectively.

Thirdly, NATO must discuss the best formula to extend its deterrence umbrella to the region. As we advocated in our previous report *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom*, we think that the best way to accomplish it is to strengthen NATO's institutional ties with Israel and, as the perfect approach, incorporate this country to the Alliance. Only this way can the image of a compact and solid strategic unit be projected, capable of deterring the Iranian leaders before they commit an error of immeasurable consequences by thinking that the security of Israel and the West can be disassociated. It is NATO's duty to make the Iranians understand clearly and soon that it would be a very serious mistake, and that Western security, broadly speaking, also includes Israel.

Finally, the Alliance must carry on with its plans to protect member states from ballistic missile attacks by using anti-missile defense systems. In fact, NATO should expand the – currently just bilateral – agreement between the United States and Poland and the Czech Republic to achieve a more extensive defensive coverage.

4. Protection against Terrorism

Territorial protection has been one of the Alliance's fundamental tasks since its inception. Yet, it is also true that with the disappearance of all credible, direct, and substantial threat on the soil of the allies and the new dimension adopted in the 1990s to project stability, the Alliance has progressively embarked on expeditionary ventures, leaving behind collective defense since it was deemed unnecessary. The Russian invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008 was a clarion call about NATO's needs regarding the defense of its members in the European continent.

In any case, we are convinced that taking a reasonable look ahead in time, the possibility of an attack on allied soil will not come from a state, but from terrorist groups – to be more precise, from global jihadism. Eight years after 9/11, the Alliance is still without a framework of collective and transatlantic intelligence regarding radical Islamism. Having left the terrorist threat into the hands of law enforcement and criminal courts as the first resort response, NATO has also left into the hands of its members the development of anti-terrorist policies at national level and without any coordination with the Alliance. In the European case, it has renounced all action in favor of the European Union. We think that NATO must establish a transatlantic policy of Homeland Defense and Security that interconnects both sides of the Atlantic and that it must initiate an institutional dialogue with the people in charge of Interior in order to define the scope and nature of possible contributions.

Likewise, in a globalized world, NATO should expand its only anti-terrorist mission as such, Operation Active Endeavor, to support weapon embargoes to groups representing a clear threat such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. It would be a good contribution to global stability.

5. How to Limit the Damage of the Global Economic Crisis

NATO is not an economic organization, but its existence and good administration depends upon its ability to count on the necessary resources and means to carry out its tasks and operations in an efficient way. The allies, with very rare exceptions, have never been able to fulfill the objectives of defense material modernization, availability of their forces, and investment in defense – not even in the best of economic times and with the global economy expanding. We fear that the present economic crisis will end up affecting the defense budgets of member states, because it is doubtful that their respective stimulus packages will take into consideration military investments. Instead, one should expect the opposite, that state deficits will be compensated with defense cuts – as it has invariably been the case.

Therefore, we think that it is unrealistic to continue talking about national or multinational modernization programs or about the transformation of armies, as if nothing had changed in the economic and financial realms. Certainly, this crisis will unevenly affect the member states of the Alliance, but it will surely call into question the modernization and standardization programs for the new members that lag economically behind and have strong social needs.

The financial crisis will also affect the will of the allies to make commitments to new missions. The currently accepted principle that a country must pay for all the expenses of the operation it undertakes, it is not only tremendously unfair, but also very dangerous because it can endanger the whole mission if the country carrying out the operation has growing difficulties to cover the costs due to financial stringencies. It can also discourage other countries who have less economic leeway in their defense budgets from accepting more commitments.

In order to palliate this double trouble – difficulty to take control of new responsibilities and growing problems to pay the bill of operations – the allies should agree on some mechanisms that, on the one hand, make the economic burden more bearable, while on the other hand, allow to go ahead with the further development of committed but expensive engagements.

Thus, firstly, NATO should urgently establish a mechanism to manage the collective funding of operations. The European Union already has one called “Athena,” to finance a part of the common costs of EU military operations. NATO should establish a system to finance not only infrastructures, but also other indispensable elements such as tactical transport and logistics. In the same way, it would be possible to create some multinational trust funds to support all those allies with the will to participate in an operation, but without the financial resources to pay for it.

Secondly, these mechanisms should be extended to the operations of the NATO Response Force, currently paid for those who rotatively participate – something that becomes random and ineffective.

Regarding the issue of acquiring new capabilities, members should fulfill their agreed commitments and keep their military up to date with suitable modern equipment. In addition, the allies must begin to think seriously about changing their approach to the issue. Without radical changes, it will be impossible to keep up the modernization of their forces.

The paradox is that the deficits in equipment are well defined. The same can be said about its location and the capabilities of members to cover them. Nevertheless, they seem impossible to solve. We propose three complementary actions in an effort to help alleviate the lack of material and capabilities:

- a) NATO should own and operate some assets of the common defense already in use – AWACS, AGS, anti-missile defense – and others belonging to the common infrastructure.
- b) To promote the acquisition of some equipment by pooling resources, especially for small countries or those with limited capital, such as the nations that have joined NATO more recently.
- c) Assign some fleets for maintenance and operation to NATO, including its modernization. Make it easier for countries with older platforms and human resources to join international missions less onerously. The costs incurred by these units could be paid by NATO's infrastructure budget.

Thirdly, we must admit that capabilities ultimately depend upon the production and the development of specific industrial programs. It is absurd that the European allies duplicate their efforts in NATO and the European Union. The European Armaments Agency and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) should start negotiations to merge into one large armament agency. Furthermore, the Alliance should tackle several challenges, for example, to supply a real transatlantic market specialized in defense material – the best way to promote business opportunities for companies on both sides of the Atlantic. It should also contribute to reduce the current equipment gap; to boost technological developments; and to create a more favorable environment of transatlantic cooperation in the economic, political and military fields.

Fourthly, the Alliance must review its infrastructure budget to determine what percentage can be assigned to common funds destined to the acquisition of capabilities. We think that a greater number of common capabilities must go together with common funds, commensurate with performance, taking advantage of all the possibilities that NATO funding has to offer.

6. A Single Strategic Vision for the Alliance

Means must be put at the service of a vision. Otherwise, it does not make sense, nor does one accurately know if one has what is necessary. In our opinion, the lack of resources and means – human as much as material – can develop into a very serious problem, since operations and, ultimately, our own defense depend on adequate military capabilities. Nevertheless, we are more worried at the present time about the strategic drift to which NATO has succumbed for some years now since it lacks a collective vision for its objectives at this stage of the twenty-first century.

The NATO 60th Anniversary Summit should serve to launch the elaboration process of a new strategic concept that replaces the 1999 notion that has already been outdated by current events. Yet, NATO also needs to put into words a more general statement about the present time and about its purpose so that the allies can reconnect. It is particularly important since we are facing important realities such as a new American administration and France's renewed commitment to NATO. In addition to the launching of a new strategic concept, the allies could entrust a group of experts, following in the tracks of the *Harmel Report*, the drafting of a new Atlantic Declaration to convey what NATO represents and to remind everyone of the renewed commitment of its members.

In any case, the Alliance must resist two temptations: the first one is to try to find its legitimacy in fields that may be fashionable at the moment, but in which the Alliance has no experience or to which it contributes very little. We are thinking of the energy issue as an example of uncharted territory, where beyond the protection of infrastructures or the maintenance of open lines of communications and transport, an organization such as NATO has very little to offer – not to mention the case of global warming. On the contrary, the Alliance must concentrate its efforts on what it knows how to do and where its presence represents an unquestionable added value – or on issues that nobody else could cover better, for example, defense against cyber attacks or protection of maritime shipping lines from piracy.

The Alliance's second temptation might be to withdraw into a geographic comfort zone. But, the world is global and security depends on global forces. In our 2005 report, we emphasized that the threats for the allies were global in nature and, for that reason, NATO's answer had to be global as well, if it wanted to be effective. Today, we are even more convinced of the validity of our argument. NATO needs regional pillars as support in order to accomplish a positive impact in world security, which, in other words, it is also the security of its members. Closing one's eyes to such a possibility is to doom the Alliance to an unnecessary and painful strategic stretching or to a dangerous withdrawal.

In order to give new impulse to a globalized, yet more coherent and compact NATO, we think that it would be very advisable to modify the current command structure, but not in a sense as to create different ones or to reduce its number. We think that it would be very positive if Allied Command Transformation, at the moment in Norfolk (Virginia, USA), were to move to Europe

– the perfect place would be in the environs of Brussels where NATO Headquarters is located today; and that Allied Command Operations, today in Mons, were to move to American soil. There are many reasons to advocate this exchange: Permeability, closeness to the American global vision for its allies, better control of the transformation stages of European armies – always trailing behind. An American should continue at the helm of Allied Command Operations while Allied Command Transformation should be in the hands of a European.

Regarding other issues, the Alliance must ponder its procedures and decision-making. In recent years, it has been all too common to resort to lower instances to water down or to hinder the decisions taken by NAC. The allies should be able to engage in free debate whenever and for as long as they deem necessary. Nonetheless, once NAC has reached a decision by unanimous agreement, all lower instances should observe it, too.

In any case, it is only fair to acknowledge that it is not the same to have an Alliance with twelve or sixteen members – it is in fact an organization of twenty-six members, and in continuous expansion. Some have suggested moving to a majority-vote decision-making system. We think that the Alliance cannot work without a unanimity system since what is at stake is to put the lives of national citizens on the line. Having said that, we agree on the need to find mechanisms that facilitate consensus building and decision-making for all those missions in which not all members participate or in which participation is clearly disparate. Yet, we admit there is no silver bullet to solve the problem; thus, the allies must talk in depth before making any decision on this matter.

Finally, in the area of a strategic vision for the Alliance, NATO leaders must pay more attention to public opinion. Without the understanding of citizens, and in the absence of a frontal attack, public support for the Alliance and its missions will be increasingly complex to keep. For that reason, NATO must redouble its pedagogical and informational efforts. The Alliance needs a well-tailored public diplomacy strategy.

7. Promoting Values and Democratic Order

A primary characteristic that distinguishes NATO is to be an Alliance of the Civilized – in terms of democratic and plural political culture; in terms of free-market economics; and in terms of religious tolerance and openness to ideas. Unfortunately, the world is not made of open and liberal countries. On the contrary, democracy advances facing enormous resistance.

At the moment, the liberal order that emerged after World War II is not only under the natural pressure of time, but it is also being contested from diverse positions and places. On the one hand, the economic crisis has unleashed the reemergence of old socialist myths about the end of capitalism and the forces that advocate government intervention, including collectivists, feel stronger than ever.

On the other hand, powers dissatisfied with the present distribution of power aspire to modify the international order, which they denounce as dominated by Westerners and in which the deck is stacked in favor of the West. The case of Russia is clear, looking for political and strategic recognition as a superpower; it is also the case of China, due to its dimensions and spectacular economic takeoff – at least for now; and, to a lesser extent, it is also the case of countries with regional impact, such as Venezuela.

Finally, there are countries and non-state actors appealing to revolution; they do not look forward to modifying the international system. They seek to destroy it and to replace it with a completely different version. It is the extreme cases of the Ayatollahs' Iran and al-Qaeda's brand of terrorism – global jihad.

The Turkish problem

The growing Islamization of Turkey and its progressive accommodation with powers hostile to the West (Iran, Syria) increase the obstacles to Turkish integration into the European Union and it could also come to represent its distancing from the Atlantic Alliance—the clash with Israel because of the Gaza operation can be a harbinger.

Certainly, these forces, that frontally resist or oppose the present world system, have little or nothing to do with each other, but combined they can come to represent a serious threat to democracies and the values that sustain them. For that reason, it is not trivial if NATO pays attention to the rise of authoritarianism and radicalism. The Alliance should furnish the means necessary to strengthen the democratic realm – which it is ultimately called to

defend. It is necessary to keep the Freedom Agenda alive as a strategic imperative.

8. Towards a Global NATO

In our 2005 report, *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom*, we advocated an Alliance with responsibilities and global reach that would incorporate countries such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Israel, as members. At the same time, it should establish partnership ties with India and Colombia. Since then, the Alliance has established ties with many of these countries based on their participation in ongoing missions. NATO has established an individual agreement of cooperation with Israel that lays the foundations for a closer operative relation. In fact, Israel has become part of the *Active Endeavor* mission. More recently, the United States has signed a highly promising agreement of strategic cooperation with India – NATO, besides being pleased with this development, should take good note.

However, we are convinced that these steps, although they represent progress in the right direction, are not enough. Out of self-interest, the Alliance must launch an outreach strategy that allows the integration of democracies that seek closer cooperation with NATO and that attracts those who have not yet considered the thought.

In this respect, we propound a series of policies: First of all, the expansion of the Alliance reaching out to liberal democratic powers, regardless of their

geographic location – as long as they want and are able to contribute to collective security. We would like to pay special attention to the case of Israel. We defend the premise that Israel is a Western nation in its own right, even if geographically, it is located in the Middle East. We think that Israel shares with the West the same threats: from a nuclear Iran to extreme jihadism. We are convinced that if Israel disappeared, pushed by whichever type of Islamism, this would be considered as a great victory by our staunchest enemies who would only find more reasons to redouble their attacks against us, the Western world.

Second, the reform of *Partnership for Peace* so that it can become global; as it is today, the program only circumscribes the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). NATO should consider Ibero-America as a region that is part from the Western world and that can make a positive contribution to the goals of the Alliance and the strengthening of the West.

Furthermore, we believe that if Iraq continues along the path to stabilization and accomplishes this goal under a pluralistic regime, we do not see any reason for not inviting the Iraqis to become part of the new Partnership of the Alliance. No one in the Western world could find a better pillar for the region and it is a great way to dispel the notion that NATO is the defender of Western civilization and it is against Arab societies or the Muslim world.

What may sound heretical today does not necessarily stay the same after some years. In fact, if we dare to think long term, no matter how difficult it may seem now, and if NATO emerges, as it should, victorious from Afghanistan having laid the foundations for a pluralistic and tolerant regime, what could be more logical than integrating Afghanistan – a creature, product of the allied effort – in the institutional arrangements that NATO has?

Only by facing the future so ambitiously, the Alliance will be able to acquire a sensible and lasting vision. For us, that vision can only revolve around the idea of defending what we are and promoting our democratic and liberal values in the rest of the world – as moral and security imperatives.

CONCLUSION:

STRENGTHENING NATO TO STRENGTHEN THE WEST

In our 2005 report, *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom*, we postulated that the allies were facing an existential threat – global jihadism was that enemy, which presented new security challenges due to its nature, ambition and objectives. Since we understood that jihadist terrorism was the most lethal expression of a more extended, deeply radical and extremist movement, we concluded our 2005 report with two basic recommendations; first, to adapt the allied strategy and structures in order to confront Islamist terrorism; and second, to turn NATO into an organization with global reach, throwing its doors open to able and prepared members, going beyond the Euro-Atlantic framework that we thought it was too constraining to launch our defense against a global threat.

To a large extent, this new report, *NATO 3.0*, is simultaneously the heir and the continuation of our 2005 report. Its theses are briefly explained hereunder:

1. First, instead of advancing towards a more stable and strategically benign environment, the world has become a complex place in which risks abound and threats proliferate. Worse yet, the enemies seem to be multiplying. We believe that the security of the allies is facing a greater danger today than four years ago.

In that sense, the Atlantic community, NATO, the West, must be aware and realize that the strategic holidays are over. If we do not defend proactively what we are, our values and interests, we would descend into increasing vulnerability of unsuspected consequences.

Like it or not, a reconfiguration of power on a global scale is taking place and this does not favor the Western world. There are elements against which it is practically impossible to fight, as the loss of demographic ascendancy or the possible loss of economic hegemony, at least regarding industrial production, but there are many others elements that can be contained or eliminated as adverse factors for our way of life, our prosperity and collective security.

2. NATO finds itself in a moment full of uncertainties while simultaneously rich in possibilities. With the appropriate orientation, the Alliance could become a global force for the construction of a new international order in which respect for human rights, tolerance, peace, and opportunity for all become the key factors.

On the one hand, the present economic crisis does not favor the main adversaries of the Western world, from Putin's Russia to Chávez's Venezuela, to Khomeinist Iran to state-capitalism's China. Lacking the necessary resources with which to pay for their dreams, ambitions and adventures, their offensive capability will inexorably decrease. Insofar as the crisis strikes them harder or that they

recover more slowly than we do, this development will favor the allies. If, on the contrary, the crisis also rages throughout our countries due to the lack of an adequate response, our enemies' advantage will tend to evaporate. Especially if one considers that autocratic governments can easily spend what they want, without having to worry about social expenses and public opinion.

A second positive element for the Alliance is the possibility to overcome the existing disputes between both sides of the Atlantic that have been typical during these years. It is not a done deal though, because the differences between the United States and its European allies, no matter how much they were depicted as personal differences, have their root causes in the evolution of the world from 1989 to our days, the global leverage of America and the scarce capability of action on the part of the Europeans. In any case, having a new administration in the White House inaugurates a stage in which it would be desirable to come to a better understanding and rapprochement among the allies regarding consultations, decisions and joint action.

The possibility that France fully rejoins the allied structures and decidedly shows a more constructive attitude and spirit that places the Atlantic Alliance at the center of its security concerns, without having to be submitted necessarily to the developments of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the European Union, will undeniably translate into the strategic and psychological strengthening of NATO.

3. NATO should not evade the strategic tasks that haunt the organization. For too long, the allies have wasted time trying to justify the need of the Alliance through issues that, in the end, have turned out to be plain strategic distractions. Still today, NATO keeps on discussing the role it can play on issues such as energy security or climate change. We believe it is a grave mistake because there is an evident risk to disregarding specific security problems in which the organization and its members do know how to act. A concrete case – as obvious as it is unacceptable – is Iran and its atomic ambitions. NATO has purportedly decided to stay completely above the fray in an issue that could have major strategic repercussions in the short run.

4. The Alliance must preserve its freedom of decision and action. Not all security problems must trigger a military response; however, if we see it the other way around, not all political problems can be solved without military contribution. NATO is an institution with the proper means to help confronting the growing phenomenon of political intimidation emanating from different corners, from Moscow to Tehran. Nobody should have the power to dictate the terms of allied decisions.

5. NATO must be able to cover its operative needs. The allies are perfectly conscious of their lack of defense material and know how to solve the problem. In an environment of increasing economic difficulties in which defense investments will inexorably decrease, the allies must look for imaginative formulas in order to support their capabilities and to incorporate the necessary ones in the future. It is possible to further institutional arrangements that favor common solutions

regarding planning as well as acquisition and maintenance of the material. We should make progress in common capabilities and, wherever possible, in force pooling. However, if we are to believe that arrangements just among allies – in line with what members are already used to do today – will suffice, then we will not generate the right response to the military deficiencies that afflict many of the members today. The time has come to adopt two strategic decisions for the future of the Alliance. On the one hand, we must incorporate new members with full capabilities to carry out actions; on the other hand, we must aim to the establishment of a real Euro-Atlantic space for defense industrial cooperation. We are aware that these are two measures of very different nature; however, they are not mutually exclusive, but complementary.

6. NATO must responsibly accept its role as the military bastion of the Western democratic world. The Alliance has been and must still be the security instrument *par excellence* of its members – that, in essence, happen to be the most advanced liberal democracies in the world. With some exceptions due to the strategic imperatives during the Cold War, NATO has served to defend the Western democratic order wherever it was threatened. In our 2005 report, we advocated to keep the steady course in that direction, but on a global scale, bearing in mind that the threats to our security were global in origin and scope. Today we are even more convinced of the validity of our thesis. What is at stake is not NATO's future on the current strategic map, but the future of the West itself that is under attack by internal tensions and external assaults at all levels – cultural, identity, military and economic.

It is sometimes said that turning NATO into a sort of league of democracies can be counterproductive, since it could deepen the feelings of confrontation between civilizations and would exacerbate the responses of our adversaries. We totally disagree with that thesis. NATO is a club of civilized nations, a privileged club for those who respect the individual, freedom and initiative – not bombs, corruption and repression. We will not be intimidated if our enemies feel aggrieved because we express publicly our collective commitment to what we are and want to be.

On the other hand, we must understand the concept of the West, not in geographic terms, but in moral, political, institutional, transparent terms, showing respect for the law, freedom and tolerance. Indeed, to be a member of NATO is not a right and to be part of the organization must be evaluated on the merits of the candidates. All members must know that, sooner or later, they will have to contribute to the defense and collective security of all members. All members must be aware that the solidarity ties trump any other issues. All members must be ready to accept responsibilities and sacrifices in defense of common security. However, besides the contribution of its capabilities, joining NATO also reflects the nature of the social and political regime. It is not an association of theocrats and tyrants, but of democrats and democracies.

In the present context, we are convinced of NATO's merits to attract to the allied field as many democracies as possible. And not only in terms of

contribution to ongoing or new operations, but as full members. We emphasize the principle of “no contribution without representation.”

Moreover, the democratic organization around the Alliance is not a mere question of identity, but it is increasingly becoming a strategic imperative. Considering the demographic and economic trends, if NATO wants to keep on playing a relevant role in the world, it will have to take into consideration all the opportunities it may have to grow its membership. Therefore, unless it understands that a good pool of human resources waits in Ibero-America, the demographic decline will be unstoppable for the majority of the allied forces – new and old. Likewise, we are convinced that incorporating nations such as Israel can mean the revitalization of the Alliance’s strategic orientation. Faced with the rise of its adversaries, NATO cannot waste the few chances that it has to crop ideas, capabilities, experience, and resources.

* * *

At its inception, having to choose between security and democracy, NATO chose the first one – though only partially since its choice was actually to guarantee the security of the democratic Western world of those days. By deterring and containing the threat that the USSR represented, the West could survive and prosper in spite of being permanently subject to the Damoclean threat of a clash that could escalate to nuclear Apocalypse.

In the current strategic environment, the allies should not have to choose what they prefer between security and democracy, since both represent the two sides of the same coin – they are inextricably linked. In fact, from the strategic point of view, they have melted into one another. It is a dangerous illusion to think that the Western world can be sustained without the expansion of freedom in the world. The West is struggling against bad numbers plus lack of patience and endurance. It is imperative that the Western front, widely defined, proactively foster an order based on the principles that are the foundation of our nations and our history.

In its 60th anniversary, NATO can choose one of the two roads ahead: To barricade in its current borders, recalibrating its expeditionary capabilities with greater emphasis on the defense of its territory; or it can go for an ambitious vision and be the guarantor of a new international order in which tolerance, freedom and free markets are respected – these are the only principles able to guarantee both security and prosperity alike and for all in the future. To defend only Europe’s security is not enough.

The Alliance has neither been nor can it become an end in itself; it is an instrument at the service of the Free World. Now, it can no longer be contented with its role as military instrument for the safety of the Euro-Atlantic zone, as it was stipulated in Article 6 of the Washington Treaty, nor can it be contented with guaranteeing stability and peace in third countries because its members do have real and urgent defensive needs. Yet, NATO must admit that the way to ensure the defense of its members is through global engagements and expanding its own

realm. Otherwise, it will be unable to achieve what is expected from the organization.

The allies' comfort zone is very well defined; to move NATO beyond those limits is a Herculean task. Nonetheless, we thought that it was our obligation to show the risks as well as the opportunities extended to the allies in order to adapt its only instrument of security to the new challenges. If ignored, NATO might go so far as to find a successful strategy for Afghanistan; however, it will not be prepared to find solutions to the other challenges coming its way.

We know that the temptation to avoid deep or radical changes will be enormous, just as it is customary in any organization – particularly if change requires the rules of unanimity and consensus. Nonetheless, we fear that if the members of NATO choose not to undergo deep changes, such as the ones the Strategic Studies Group suggests, the Alliance's days are numbered as a relevant instrument for the security of its members – no matter how long its bureaucratic structure lasts.

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Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos (GEES)
Diego de León, 47
28006 Madrid, Spain

<http://www.gees.org>
info@gees.org